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Abstract. We reconsider the problem of cartel stability in a linear
symmetric Cournot oligopoly by assuming that every coalition of firms defecting
from a cartel can choose its quantity before the remaining firms. We show that
diﬀerently from Salant et al. (1983) the only profitable cartel includes all firms
in the industry. This result is shown to be robust to non linearities in payoﬀs
provided that the inverse demand function is not too log-concave.
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1. Introduction
Within the wide and heterogeneous literature on cartels and horizontal mergers the
seminal result by Salant et al. (1983), characterizing the smallest profitable cartel
under Cournot oligopoly, has been recently shown to play an important role also
in endogenous cartel formation games (see Bloch, 1997 and Yi, 1997 for surveys).
One relevant case is the well known Hurt and Kurz (1988) gamma game of coalition
formation, for which all stable coalition structures require the presence of a cartel of
at least the minimal size s∗ defined by Salant et al. (1983), all remaining (n − s∗)
firms playing independently. The prediction of such a wide set of stable coalition
structures can be viewed as a limitation of the theory, at least in terms of policy
indications.
The purpose of our paper is to show that, if firms defecting from a cartel set their
new quantity as leaders with respect to the fringe of remaining firms, then cartels of
the size s∗ defined by Salant et al. (1983) are no longer stable, and the only stable
cartel includes all firms in the market. Moreover, this result is shown to be robust to
non linearities of the firm’s payoﬀ, provided that the inverse demand function is not
too log-concave.
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2. The Model
Let us assume a finite n-firms symmetric oligopoly model with the usual inverse
demand function defined by:
p (Q) = a− bQ
where Q =
P
i∈N qi is the total market quantity and, for every firm i ∈ N , a cost
function given by:
Ci (qi) = cqi.
The constraints on the parameters are:
a > c ≥ 0 and b > 0.
It is easy to compute the payoﬀ of a cartel of size s = |S| ≤ |N | when the
remaining firms are independent Cournot players:
ΠS =
X
i∈S
πi
µ
q∗S,
³
q∗j
´
j /∈S
¶
=
(a− c)2
b(n− s+ 2)2 . (1)
Salant et al. (1983) define a profitable cartel as a coalition of firms that produce,
by competing against the fringe of remaining firms, a per member profit which is
higher than the profit of each firm in the absence of cartels. They reach the following
result.
Proposition 1. (Salant et al. (1983)). The minimum profitable cartel in a linear
Cournot oligopoly has a size equal to s∗ = 2n+3−
√
4n+5
2
.
Proof. By normalizing (a−c)
2
b
= 1, ΠS
s
= 1
s(n−s+2)2 ≥ πi = 1(n+1)2 for s∗ ≥
2n+3−√4n+5
2
≥ 0, 8n.
The formation of a cartel, and, more in general, the switch by a group of firms
to a new coordinated set of actions, may imply the exploitation of some sort of ”first
mover advantage”. This is the case, for instance, of firms wishing to leave a cartel
in order to reach a new collusive agreement, setting their new quantities before their
defection is detected by the other firms. The payoﬀ of a cartel acting as a Stackelberg
leader against the fringe of remaining firms is given by:
ΠLS =
X
i∈S
πi
³bqS, (qj (bqS))j /∈S´ = (a− c)24b (n− s+ 1) , (2)
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where the function qj (qS) is the equilibrium strategy of the representative fringe firm
when qS is played by the cartel, for all possible qS. A profitable cartel can here be
defined, as in Salant et al. (1983), as a cartel giving to its members a higher payoﬀ
than each of them would get by acting non cooperatively, that is, by leaving the
cartel. The following proposition shows that, in this case, the whole industry is the
unique profitable cartel.
Proposition 2. When cartels’ profits are given by (2), the only profitable cartel is
the entire industry cartel.
Proof. This result simply follows from expression (2). Under normalization,
ΠLS
s
=
1
4s (n− s+ 1) (3)
and
πL
i
=
1
4n
. (4)
It is easy to see that (3) is smaller than (4) for 1 < s < n and also that they coincide
for s = n (see also the figure below). This is equal to say that the only cartel that
is not objectable by the most profitable deviation (that of just one firm) is the whole
industry cartel, thus representing the only profitable cartel.
The meaning of the above result is that, when firms deviating from a cartel can
pre-commit to a (collusive) joint strategy, anticipating that the fringe firms will react
non cooperatively, only the entire industry cartel is profitable. This is illustrated
through an example (n = 20 and s = 1,..20) in which the sequential equal-split payoﬀ
ΠLS
s
(thick line) and the simultaneous one ΠS
s
(thin line) are compared. It is easy to
see that, while ΠS
s
starts to be profitable (greater than πi) for s
∗ ≥ 17(≥ 0, 8n), ΠLS
s
< πLi for s ∈ [2, 19] and Π
L
S
s
= πLi for s = n = 20.
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To check the robustness of this result, note that the whole industry cartel is still
profitable in a symmetric Cournot oligopoly, provided that every firm’s profit function
does not decrease too much with the other firms’ output. This property has been
shown to depend on the degree of log-concavity of the inverse demand function P (.)
(see Amir, 1996 and Vives, 2000). As an example, let P (Q) = (a−Q)β , with a > Q
and c = 0. This function is log-concave for β ≥ 0, concave for β ≤ 1 and convex
for β ≥ 1. The unique Cournot equilibrium is q∗i = aβ+n for every i ∈ N . Also, very
simple algebra yields the following cartel profit function:
ΠLS = a
β+1β2β (β + 1)−β−1 (β + n − s)−β . (5)
By computing the diﬀerence between the eﬃcient equal-split allocation and what
a single firm obtains, we get
ΠLN
n
− πLi = ββ (β + n− 1)−β n− 1 > 0⇔ β > 1. (6)
It follows that the cartel including all firms in the industry is profitable only when
P (.) is convex, that is, for low degrees of log-concavity. This feature implies that best
reply functions are not ”too” decreasing, thus ensuring that deviating firms, acting
as leaders, do not exploit too much their first mover advantage. When best reply
functions are increasing (supermodular games), the above result can be also shown
to be robust against every coalitional deviation (see Currarini and Marini (2002) for
a more general framework).
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